Utente:Torredibabele/Sandbox

Il Sistema Europeo di Scambio delle Quote di Emissioni (in inglese Emission Trading Scheme o EU ETS) è il più grande mercato delle emissioni transnazionale esistente al mondo.[1] Lanciato nel 2005, rappresenta un pilastro fondamentale della politica dell'Unione europea sul cambiamento climatico. Il sistema copre più di 10.000 impianti industriali e energetici la cui potenza termica nominale supera i 20 MW, responsabili di quasi la metà delle emissioni di CO2 all'interno dell'Unione e di circa il 40% delle emissioni di tutti i gas serra.[2][3]

Sotto l'EU ETS, gli impianti che emettono grandi quantità di anidride carbonica all'interno della UE devono monitorare e riferire annualmente i loro livelli di emissione, e contemporaneamente devono consegnare al governo un ammontare di quote di emissione pari alle loro emissioni di CO2 per quell'anno. Per tenere conto delle irregolarità nei livelli di emissione di CO2 che possono verificarsi annualmente a causa di condizioni climatiche estreme (come inverni molto rigidi o estati molto calde), le quote di emissione per ogni impianto soggetto allo schema sono rilasciate per un periodo pluriennale: tale periodo è chiamato periodo di scambio (trading period). Il primo periodo di scambio è iniziato nel gennaio 2005 e terminato nel dicembre 2007; le quote di emissione riferite a tale periodo non possono essere utilizzate nei periodi successivi.

Il secondo periodo di scambio è iniziato a gennaio 2008, e si protrarrà fino a dicembre 2012. Attualmente, il sistema prevede che ciascun impianto riceva le proprie quote di emissione dal Piano di Assegnazione Nazionale (PNA) stabilito dai governi nazionali. Oltre a ricevere una quota di emissione iniziale, un operatore può acquistare quote europee e internazionali. Se un operatore è riuscito a ridurre le proprie emissioni di CO2, può vendere parte delle proprie quote traendone un profitto.

Nel gennaio 2008, la Commissione europea ha proposto dei cambiamenti al sistema, fra cui l'assegnazione delle quote da parte di una autorità europea invece che tramite i Piani di Assegnazione Nazionali, la messa all'asta di una percentuale più grande (+ 60%) di quote, invece di assegnarle gratuitamente, e l'inclusione di altri gas serra, fra cui l'ossido di diazoto e i perfluorocarburi.[4] Tali emendamenti sono ancora in fase propositiva, ed è probabile verranno approvati a partire da gennaio 2013, ossia nel corso del terzo periodo di scambio.

Inoltre, il tetto di emissioni totali per il terzo periodo di scambio prevede nel 2020 una riduzione dei gas serra nei settori di riferimento pari al 21% dei valori del 2005. Il sistema è stato recentemente esteso alle compagnie aeree, ma tale novità entrerà in vigore solo a partire dal 2012.[5][6]

Funzonamento del sistemaModifica

La prima fase del sistema, nella mente dei suoi promulgatori, doveva operare indipendentemente dai trattati internazionali sul clima come la precedente Convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici (UNFCCC, 1992), o il Protocollo di Kyoto stabilito sulla base di quest'ultima: quando nel 16 febbraio 2005 il Protocollo di Kyoto entrò in vigore, la prima fase del sistema di scambio europeo era già operativa. Successivamente, la UE accettò di integrare i meccanismi flessibili del Protocollo all'interno del proprio sistema: la "direttiva di collegamento" permette agli operatori di utilizzare un certo ammontare dei certificati emessi sotto i meccanismi flessibili di Kyoto per coprire le proprie emissioni.

I meccanismi flessibili previsti dal protocollo di Kyoto sono:

Considerato che le riduzioni di emissioni ottenute tramite i meccanismi di sviluppo pulito sono conformi al sistema di scambio europeo, il commercio internazionale delle emissioni assume un ruolo rilevante. I certificati di riduzione delle emissioni possono essere ottenuti promuovendo progetti di riduzione delle emissioni nei paesi in via di sviluppo fuori dalla UE che abbiano ratificato o aderito al Protocollo di Kyoto. La messa in atto di progetti di sviluppo pulito è regolata dagli accordi di Marrakech, una estensione degli accordi promulgati dalla Conferenza delle Parti nell'ambito del Protocollo di Kyoto. Nel formulare la struttura del sistema di scambio europeo, il legislatore ha agito in maniera indipendente, ma ha preso spunto dall'esperienza acquisita nell'ambito del sistema di scambio delle emissioni britannico implementato negli anni precedenti,[7] e ha collaborato con diversi soggetti per fare sì che la legislazione e il funzionamento del sistema fossero compatibili con lo schema delineato dalla Convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici.

Sotto il sistema europeo, i governi degli stati membri della UE approvano i tetti di emissione nazionali, che devono essere approvati dalla Commissione europea. Successivamente, i singoli paesi distribuiscono le quote ai loro operatori industriali, controllando il livello di emissioni basandosi sul tetto a loro assegnato. Le relative quote sono ritirate dopo la fine di ciascun anno.

Gli operatori all'interno del sistema europeo possono scambiare le loro quote in vari modi:

Al pari di ogni altro strumento finanziario, quest'ultimo caso è rappresentato dall'incontro fra compratori e venditori membri della stessa borsa e dal raggiungimento di un accordo, con una parte che cede una quota valida in cambio di una controparte finanziaria prestabilita. Così come all'interno di un mercato azionario, le imprese e i singoli individui possono effettuare operazioni di scambio tramite intermediari registrati nella borsa.

Il registro nazionale e la Commissione europea sono tenuti al corrente degli scambi delle varie quote e autorizzano le relative transazioni. Durante la seconda fase del sistema di scambio europeo anche l'UNFCCC convalida gli scambi di quote che alterino la loro distribuzione secondo ciascun Piano di Assegnazione Nazionale.

In maniera simile al Protocollo di Kyoto, il sistema europeo prevede che un operatore possa utilizzare i cosiddetti crediti di carbonio sotto forma di unità di riduzione delle emissioni per fare fronte ai propri obblighi. Il sistema di Kyoto prevede la presenza di riduzioni di emissioni certificate, derivanti da un progetto per il carbonio certificato dal consiglio di amministrazione per i meccanismi di sviluppo pulito dell'UNFCCC, oppure di unità di riduzione delle emissioni certificate dal paese ospite di un progetto a implementazione congiunta o dal Comitato di Supervisione per l'Implementazione Congiunta; entrambi sono accettati dal sistema di scambio europeo.

Dunque una quota di emissioni europea pari ad una tonnellata di CO2 è fatta in modo da essere identica ("fungibile") ad una "unità di quantità assegnata" di CO2 secondo il sistema di Kyoto. Nello schema europeo è quindi possibile scambiare alla pari le riduzioni di emissioni certificate dell'UNFCCC e le quote di emissione europee; tuttavia, per motivi tecnici, la completa equivalenza fra i due sistemi non è stata raggiunta fino al 2008-2009[8].

Durante la seconda fase del sistema di scambio europeo, gli operatori all'interno di ciascuno stato membro hanno dovuto fare trasitare e fare controllare le loro quote attraverso la UE prima che potessero essere ritirate dall'UNFCCC.

Allocazione delle quoteModifica

Nel sistema di scambio europeo, il prezzo dell'anidride carbonica dipende dal numero totale di quote rilasciate (sia gratuitamente o tramite asta), ma il suo preciso valore è stabilito dal mercato. Il rilascio di troppe quote comporta un prezzo basso, e quindi uno scarso incentivo a ridurre il proprio livello di emissioni da parte degli operatori (Newbery, 2009).[9]. Al contrario, il rilascio di un numero di quote troppo esiguo comporta un prezzo dell'anidride carbonica troppo alto (Hepburn, 2006, p. 239).[10]

In ciascuna fase, le quote totali che ogni stato membro deve assegnare sono specificate nei Piani di Assegnazione Nazionali. La Commissione Europea supervisiona tali piani e stabilisce se soddisfano i criteri elenacati nell'Allegato III della direttiva sullo scambio di quote di emissioni (2003/87/EC). Criterio fondamentale è che la quantità di quote proposta sia coerente con gli obiettivi di Kyoto dello stato membro.

Oltre ai settori coperte dal sistema di scambio europeo, ciascuno stato membro può tenere conto dei livelli di emissione in altri settori. Ad esempio, i trasporti sono responsabili del 21% delle emissioni di gas serra della UE, i nuclei familiari e le piccole e medie imprese del 17% e le attività agricole del 10%.[11]

Durante la prima fase, la maggior parte delle quote è stata assegnata gratuitamente. Questo approccio è stato criticato per garantire profitti fortuiti ai beneficiari delle quote, per essere meno efficiente dell'assegnazione tramite asta e per comportare pochi incentivi allo sviluppo di fonti di energia pulite e rinnovabili.[12][13] D'altra parte, l'allocazione libera rispetto a quella tramita asta competitiva può essere giustificata per alcuni settori, come l'alluminio e l'acciaio, soggetti alla concorrenza internazionale e dove il prezzo della CO2 svolge un ruolo importante (Neuhoff, 2009;[14] Newbery, 2009; Carbon Trust, 2009;[15] Vedi anche la sezione sulla competitività).

Per fare fronte a tali problemi, la Commissione Europea ha proposto diversi cambiamenti nel gennaio 2008, fra cui l'abolizione dei Piani d'Assegnazione Nazionali a partire dal 2013, e la messa all'asta di un sempre maggior numero di quote (partendo dal 60% nel 2013). Nel corso della terza fase (gennaio 2013), le quote saranno assegnate tramite un sistema centralizzato a livello europeo.[16]

CompetitivitàModifica

L'allocazione libera delle quote può essere un mezzo per rispondere alle preoccupazioni sulla perdita di competitività delle industrie, e della possibile delocalizzazione fuori dalla UE delle imprese ad alto tasso di emissioni. Questo ultimo fenomeno implicherebbe infatti un incremento delle emissioni nei paesi o nei settori con una regolamentazione meno rigida rispetto ad un altro paese o settore (Barker et al., 2007).[17] Una ricerca del Carbon Trust (2009) ha mostrato come la perdita di competitività può riguardare settori come la produzione di cemento, alluminio, carta, fertilizzanti e l'industria chimica inorganica di base.

Sempre secondo il Carbon Trust (2009), i processi di delocalizzazione possono essere contrastati garantendo delle quote gratuite alle industrie interessate che fungerebbero da sussidi temporanei, me questa soluzione non risolverebbe il problema alla radice. Una politica economicamente efficiente sarebbe l'istituzione di dazi, in cui le importazioni verrebbero tassate a seconda dell'ammontare di CO2 che comportano (Neuhoff, 2009;[14] Newbery, 2009).[9] Tuttavia simili dazi potrebbero essere sfruttati come strumento per perseguire una politica commerciale protezionista (Grubb et al., p. 5).[18] Alcuni dazi non non potrebbero nemmeno prevenire i processi di delocalizzazione.

Banking and borrowingModifica

Within a trading phase, banking and borrowing is allowed. For example, a 2006 EUA can be used in 2007 (Banking) or in 2005 (Borrowing). Interperiod borrowing is not allowed. Member states had the discretion to decide if banking EUA's from Phase I to Phase II was allowed or not.[19]

Phase IModifica

In the first phase (2005–2007), the EU ETS includes some 12,000 installations, representing approximately 40% of EU CO2 emissions,[20] covering energy activities (combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens), production and processing of ferrous metals, mineral industry (cement clinker, glass and ceramic bricks) and pulp, paper and board activities.

Launch and operationModifica

The scheme, in which all 15 member states that were then members of the European Union participated, nominally commenced operation on 1 January 2005, although national registries were unable to settle transactions for the first few months. However, the prior existence of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme meant that market participants were already in place and ready. In its first year, 362 million tonnes of CO2 were traded on the market for a sum of €7.2 billion, and a large number of futures and options.[21] The price of allowances increased more or less steadily to a peak level in April 2006 of about €30 per tonne CO2,[22] but fell in May 2006 to under €10/ton on news that some countries were likely to give their industries such generous emission caps that there was no need for them to reduce emissions. Lack of scarcity under the first phase of the scheme continued through 2006 resulting in a trading price of €1.2 a tonne in March 2007, declining to €0.10 in September 2007.

Verified emissions have seen a net increase over the first phase of the scheme. For the countries for which data is available (all 27 member states minus Romania, Bulgaria and Malta), emissions increased by 1.9% between 2005 and 2007.

Country Verified emissions Change
2005 2006 2007 2005–2007
  Austria 33,372,826 32,382,804 31,751,165 -4.9%
  Belgio 55,363,223 54,775,314 52,795,318 -4.6%
  Cipro 5,078,877 5,259,273 5,396,164 6.2%
  Rep. Ceca 82,454,618 83,624,953 87,834,758 6.5%
  Germania 474,990,760 478,016,581 487,004,055 2.5%
  Danimarca 26,475,718 34,199,588 29,407,355 11.1%
  Estonia 12,621,817 12,109,278 15,329,931 21.5%
  Spagna 183,626,981 179,711,225 186,495,894 1.6%
  Finlandia 33,099,625 44,621,411 42,541,327 28.5%
  Francia 131,263,787 126,979,048 126,634,806 -3.5%
  Grecia 71,267,736 69,965,145 72,717,006 2.0%
  Ungheria 26,161,627 25,845,891 26,835,478 2.6%
  Irlanda 22,441,000 21,705,328 21,246,117 -5.3%
  Italia 225,989,357 227,439,408 226,368,773 0.2%
  Lituania 6,603,869 6,516,911 5,998,744 -9.2%
  Lussemburgo 2,603,349 2,712,972 2,567,231 -1.4%
  Lettonia 2,854,481 2,940,680 2,849,203 -0.2%
  Paesi Bassi 80,351,288 76,701,184 79,874,658 -0.6%
  Polonia 203,149,562 209,616,285 209,601,993 3.2%
  Portogallo 36,425,915 33,083,871 31,183,076 -14.4%
  Svezia 19,381,623 19,884,147 15,348,209 -20.8%
  Slovenia 8,720,548 8,842,181 9,048,633 3.8%
  Slovacchia 25,231,767 25,543,239 24,516,830 -2.8%
  Regno Unito 242,513,099 251,159,840 256,581,160 5.8%
Total 2,012,043,453 2,033,636,557 2,049,927,884 1.9%

Consequently, observers and NGO's have accused national governments of abusing the system under industry pressure, and have urged for far stricter caps in the second phase (2008–2012).[24]

Phase IIModifica

Million Metric Tonnes of CO2 yearly allowances
Member State 1st period cap 2005 verified emissions 2008-2012 cap
State request Cap allowed
  Austria 33.0 33.4 32.8 30.7
  Belgio 62.08 55.58 † 63.33 58.5
  Bulgaria 42.3 40.6 67.6 42.3
  Cipro 5.7 5.1 7.12 5.48
  Rep. Ceca 97.6 82.5 101.9 86.8
  Danimarca 33.5 26.5 24.5 24.5
  Estonia 19 12.62 24.38 12.72
  Finlandia 45.5 33.1 39.6 37.6
  Francia 156.5 131.3 132.8 132.8
  Ungheria 31.3 26.0 30.7 26.9
  Germania 499 474 482 453.1
  Grecia 74.4 71.3 75.5 69.1
  Irlanda 22.3 22.4 22.6 21.15
  Italia 223.1 222.5 209 195.8
  Lettonia 4.6 2.9 7.7 3.3
  Lituania 12.3 6.6 16.6 8.8
  Lussemburgo 3.4 2.6 3.95 2.7
  Malta†††† 2.9 1.98 2.96 2.1
  Paesi Bassi 95.3 80.35 †† 90.4 85.8
  Polonia 239.1 203.1 284.6 208.5
  Portogallo 38.9 36.4 35.9 34.8
  Romania 74.8 70.8 95.7 75.9
  Slovacchia 30.5 25.2 41.3 30.9
  Slovenia 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.3
  Spagna 174.4 182.9 152.7 152.3
  Svezia 22.9 19.3 25.2 22.8
  Regno Unito 245.3 242.4 ††† 246.2 246.2
Totals 2057.8 1910.66 2054.92 1859.27
Source: Last EU press release IP/07/1614: "Emissions trading: EU-wide cap for 2008-2012 set at 2.08 billion allowances after assessment of national plans for Bulgaria", 26 October 2007[25]. Access to the previous press releases (Nov 2006 - October 2007) in the linked page.


Additional installations and emissions included in the second trading period are not included in this table but are given in the sources.
*† Including installations opted out in 2005.
*†† Verified emissions for 2005 do not include installations opted out in 2005 which will be covered in 2008 and 2012 and are estimated to amount to some 6 Mt.
*††† UK's verified emissions for 2005 do not include installations opted out in 2005 which will be covered in 2008 and 2012 and are estimated to amount to some 30 Mt.
*††††Cyprus and Malta, as new EU accession states, but not Annex I countries, will have their own NAPs and participate in trading during Phase II.

The second phase (2008–12) expands the scope significantly:

  • CDM and JI credits are introduced in second phase through the EU's 'Linking Directive'. Although this was a theoretical possibility in phase I, the over-allocation of permits combined with the inability to bank them for use in the second phase meant it was not taken up.[26]
  • Aviation emissions are expected to be included from 2012.[27]
  • In 2007, it was announced that three non-EU members, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein joined the scheme.[28]

The inclusion of aviation is a move considered important due to the large and rapidly growing emissions of the sector. The inclusion of aviation is estimated to lead to an increase in demand of allowances about 10-12 million tonnes of CO2 per year in phase two. This in turn is expected to lead to an increased use of JI credits from projects in Russia and Ukraine, which would offset the increase in prices and eventually result in no discernible impact on average annual CO2 prices.[29]

Ultimately, the Commission wishes the post-2012 ETS to include all greenhouse gases and all sectors, including aviation, maritime transport and forestry.[30] For the transport sector, the large number of individual users adds complexities, but might be implemented either as a cap-and-trade system for fuel suppliers or a baseline-and-credit system for car manufacturers.[31]

The National Allocation Plans for Phase II, the first of which were announced on 29 November 2006, result in an average cut of nearly 7% below the 2005 emission levels.[32] The use of offsets from JI and CDM projects was allowed, with the result that no reductions in the EU will be required to meet the Phase II cap (CCC, 2008, pp. 145, 149).[33] According to verified EU data from 2008, the ETS saw an emissions reduction of 3%, or 50 million tons. At least 80 million tons of “carbon offsets” which were bought as part of the scheme.[34]

The annual Member State CO2 yearly allowances in million tonnes are shown in the table:

In late 2006, European Commission started infringement proceedings against Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy and Spain, for failure to submit their proposed National Allocation Plans on time.[35]

Carbon price

The carbon price within Phase II increased to over €20/tCO2 in the first half of 2008 (CCC, 2008, p. 149). The average price was €22/tCO2 in the second half of 2008, and €13/tCO2 in the first half of 2009. CCC (2009, p. 67) gave two reasons for this fall in prices:[36]

  • Reduced output in energy-intensive sectors as a result of the recession. This means that less abatement will be required to meet the cap, lowering the carbon price.
  • The market perception of future fossil fuel prices may have been revised downwards.

Projections indicate that like Phase I, Phase II will see a surplus in allowances. According to Grubb et al. (2009, p. 12), carbon prices are being sustained by the prospect of banking allowances to use them in the tougher third phase.[18]

Phase IIIModifica

For Phase III (2013–20), the European Commission has proposed a number of changes, including (CCC, 2008, p. 149):[33]

  • the setting an overall EU cap, with allowances then allocated to EU members;
  • tighter limits on the use of offsets;
  • unlimiting banking of allowances between Phases II and III;
  • and a move from allowances to auctioning.

Projections to 2020

CCC (2008, p. 151) made projections of the expected cap for the EU ETS out to 2020. For a 20% cut in EU economy-wide emissions relative to 1990 levels, the reduction in total emissions was projected to be around 36 million tonnes per annum. CCC (2009, p. 68) projected a carbon price in 2020 of around 22 Euro/tCO2.[36] Most market commentators project a price around or below 30 Euro/tCO2. These carbon price projections are subject to great uncertainty, e.g., over future fossil fuel prices, and predicting business-as-usual emissions (p. 69).

CostsModifica

According to Grubb et al. (2009, pp. 3–4), the EU ETS has been able to meet its environmental objectives at costs significantly lower than projected.[18] The estimated cost was a small fraction of 1% GDP. It was suggested that if permits were auctioned, and the revenues used effectively, e.g., to reduce distortionary taxes and fund low-carbon technologies, costs could be eliminated, or even create a positive economic impact.

Overall emission reductionsModifica

A number of design flaws have limited the effectiveness of the EU ETS (Jones et al., 2007, p. 64).[37] In the initial 2005-07 period, emission caps were not tight enough to drive a significant reduction in emissions (CCC, 2008, p. 140).[33] The total allocation of allowances turned out to exceed actual emissions. This was a factor in driving the carbon price down to zero in 2007, the other main factor being that allowances were not allowed to be 'banked' for use in Phase II, therefore had no monetary value outside of Phase I. This oversupply reflects the difficulty in predicting future emissions which is necessary in setting a cap (Carbon Trust, 2009).[15]

Phase I

In 2004, Ecofys analysed the then available preliminary NAPs of all EU countries.[38] The information suggested that the caps for Phase I were lenient; in most countries, the power sector would not need to reduce CO2 emissions as much as the country as a whole, in other words the other sectors must make more ambitious emission reductions than the power sector under the scheme. More strikingly, a few countries (such as the Netherlands) gave more allowances than Ecofys estimated to be needed under a business-as-usual scenario, implying that no 'real' efforts to reduce emissions would be required. In their analysis of the Phase I NAPs, the NGO Climate Action Network called the caps a 'major disappointment',[39] arguing that only two (UK and Germany) of the 25 EU states asked the participating industry sectors to reduce emissions compared to historic levels and found that in the 15 old EU member states as a whole, allocations were 4.3% higher than the base year. In May 2006, when several countries revealed registries indicating that their industries had been allocated more allowances than they could use, trading prices crashed from about €30/ton to €10/ton, and (after an initial slight recovery) declined further to €4 in January 2007[40] and below €1 in February 2007, reaching an all time low of €0.03 at the beginning of December 2007[41]

Ellerman and Buchner (2008) (referenced by Grubb et al., 2009, p. 11) suggested that during its first two years in operation, the EU ETS turned an expected increase in emissions of 1-2 percent per year into a small absolute decline.[18] Grubb et al. (2009, p. 11) suggested that a reasonable estimate for the emissions cut achieved during its first two years of operation was 50-100 MtCO2 per year, or 2.5-5%.

Phase II

In 2006, Ecofys performed an initial assessment of NAPs for phase II, using the proposed but not-yet-approved NAPs.[42] They found that most member states did not have sufficiently strict caps, and that they would be insufficient in assisting the members in meeting their Kyoto targets. They also compared caps with official business-as-usual (BAU) projections and with independent BAU projections to assess stringency of caps. They concluded that the caps were 7% under official BAU but (except for Portugal, Spain, and UK) the proposed cap was "higher" than the independently estimated BAU, suggesting overallocation.

Partly in response to this, the Commission cut eleven of the first twelve Phase II plans it reviewed (accepting only the U.K.'s plan without revision). The commission tightened the caps some 7%,[43] also corresponding with 7% below the 2005 emissions. For Phase II, the cap is expected to result in an emissions reduction in 2010 of about 2.4% compared to expected emissions without the cap (business-as-usual emissions) (Jones et al., 2007, p. 64).[37]

The inclusion of sinksModifica

Currently, the EU does not allow CO2 credits under ETS to be obtained from sinks (e.g. reducing CO2 by planting trees). However, some governments and industry representatives lobby for their inclusion. The inclusion is currently opposed by NGOs as well as the EU commission itself, arguing that sinks are surrounded by too many scientific uncertainties over their permanence and that they have inferior long-term contribution to climate change compared to reducing emissions from industrial sources.[44]

28 Million Euro CyberfraudModifica

On January 19, 2011, the EU emissions spot market for pollution permits was closed after computer hackers stole 28 to 30 million euros ($41.12 million) worth of emissions allowances from the national registries of several European countries within a few day time period. The Czech Registry for Emissions Trading was especially hard hit with 7 million euros worth of allowances stolen by hackers from Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Estonia and Poland. A phishing scam is suspected to have enabled hackers to log into unsuspecting companies' carbon credit accounts and transfer the allowances to themselves, allowing them to then be sold.[45][46]

The European Commission said it would "proceed to determine together with national authorities what minimum security measures need to be put in place before the suspension of a registry can be lifted." Maria Kokkonen, E.C. spokeswoman for climate issues, said that national registries can be reopened once sufficient security measures have been enacted and member countries submit to the EC a report of their IT security protocol.

The Czech registry said there are still legal and administrative hurdles to be overcome and Jiri Stastny, chairman of OTE AS, the Czech registry operator, said that until there is recourse for victims of such theft, and a system is in place to return allowances to their rightful owners, the Czech registry will remain closed. Registry officials in Germany and Estonia have confirmed they have located 610,000 allowances stolen from the Czech registry, according to Mr. Stastny. Another 500,000 of the stolen Czech allowances are thought to be in accounts in the U.K., the OTE said.[45][46][47]

The security breaches raised fears among some traders that they might have unknowingly purchased stolen allowances which they might later have to forfeit. The ETS experienced a previous phishing scam in 2010 which caused 13 European markets to shut down, and criminals cleared 5 million euros in another cross-border fraud in 2008 and 2009.[46]

Views on the EU ETSModifica

Template:Inappropriate tone Template:POV-section

Different people and organizations have responded differently to the EU ETS. Mr Anne Theo Seinen, of the EC's Directorate-General for the Environment, described Phase I as a "learning phase," where, for example, the infrastructure and institutions for the ETS were set up (UK Parliament, 2009).[48] In his view, the carbon price in Phase I had resulted in some abatement. Seinen also commented that the EU ETS needed to be supported by other policies for technology and renewable energy. According to CCC (2008, p. 155), technology policy is necessary to overcome market failures associated with delivering low-carbon technologies, e.g., by supporting research and development.[33]

The World Wildlife Fund (2009) commented that there was no indication that the EU ETS had influenced longer-term investment decisions.[49] In their view, the Phase III scheme brought about significant improvements, but still suffered from major weaknesses. Jones et al. (2008, p. 24) suggested that the EU ETS needed further reform to achieve its potential.[50]

Criticisms

The EU ETS has been criticizedTemplate:By whom for several failings, including: over-allocation, windfall profits, price volatility, and in general for failing to meet its goals.[51] ProponentsTemplate:Who argue, however, that Phase I of the EU ETS (2005–2007) was a "learning phase" designed primarily to establish baselines and create the infrastructure for a carbon market, not to achieve significant reductions.[52][53][54]

In addition, the EU ETS has been criticized as having caused a disruptive spike in energy prices.[55] They say that it does not correlate with the price of permits, and in fact the largest price increase occurred at a time (Mar-Dec 2007) when the cost of permits was negligible.[54]

Over-allocation

There was an oversupply of emissions allowances for EU ETS Phase I. This drove the carbon price down to zero in 2007 (CCC, 2008, p. 140).[33] This oversupply reflects the difficulty in predicting future emissions which is necessary in setting a cap (Carbon Trust, 2009).[15] Given poor data about emissions baselines, inherent uncertainty of emissions forecasts, and the very modest reduction goals of the Phase I cap (1-2% across the EU), it was entirely expected thatTemplate:Whom? the cap might be set too high.[54]

This problem naturally diminishes as the cap tightens. The EU's Phase II cap is more than 6% below 2005 levels, much stronger than Phase I, and readily distinguishable from business-as-usual emissions levels.Template:Whom?[54]

Also, note that over-allocation does not imply that no abatement occurred. Even with over-allocation, there was a real price on carbon, and that price had an effect on emitters' behavior. Verified emissions in 2005 were 3-4% below projected emissions,[53] and analysis suggests that at least part of that reduction was due to the EU ETS.[56]

Windfall profits

According to Newbery (2009), the price of EUAs was passed fully in the final price of electricity.[9] The free allocation of permits was cashed in at the EUA price by fossil generators, resulting in a "massive windfall gain." Newbery (2009) wrote that "[there] is no case for repeating such a wilful misuse of the value of a common property resource that should be owned by the country." In the view of 4CMR (2009), all permits in the EU ETS should be auctioned.[57] This would avoid possible windfall profits in all sectors.

Price volatility

The price of emissions permits tripled in the first six months of Phase I, collapsed by half in a one-week period in 2006, and declined to zero over the next twelve months. Such movements and the implied volatility raise questions about the viability of this trading system to provide stable incentives to emitters.[54]

This criticism has face validity. In future phases, measures such as banking of allowances and price floors may be used to mitigate volatility.[58] However, it's important to note that considerable volatility is expected of this type of market, and the volatility seen is quite in line with that of energy commodities generally. Nonetheless, producers and consumers in those markets respond rationally and effectively to price signals.[54]

Newbery (2009) commented that the EU ETS was not delivering the stable carbon price necessary for long-term, low-carbon investment decisions.[9] He suggested that efforts should be made to stabilize carbon price, e.g., by having a price-ceiling and a price-floor.

Crime

In 2009 Europol informed that 90% market volume of emissions traded in some countries could be result of tax fraud, costing governments more than 5 billion euro.[59] Cyber fraudsters have also attacked the EU ETS with a "phishing" scam which cost one company €1.5 million.[60] In response to this, the EU has revised the ETS rules to combat crime.[61]

Offsetting

The EU ETS allows the use of offset credits from JI and CDM projects. The main advantage of allowing free trading of credits is that it allows mitigation to be done at least-cost (CCC, 2008, p. 160).[33] This is because the marginal costs (that is to say, the incremental costs of preventing the emission of one extra ton of CO2e into the atmosphere) of abatement differs among countries. In terms of the UK's climate change policy, CCC (2008), noted three arguments against too great a reliance on credits:

  • Rich countries need to demonstrate that a low-carbon economy is possible and compatible with economic prosperity. This is in order to convince developing countries to lower their emissions. Additionally, domestic action by rich countries drives investment towards a low-carbon economy.
  • An ambitious long-term target to reduce emissions, e.g., an 80% cut in UK emissions by 2050, requires significant domestic progress by 2020 and 2030 to reduce emissions.
  • CDM credits are inherently less robust than a cap and trade system, where reductions are required in total emissions.

Due to the economic downturn, states have pushed successfully for a more generous approach towards the use of CDM/JI credits post-2012.[62]Template:Attribution needed The 2009 EU ETS Amending Directive states that credits can be used for up to 50 % of the EU-wide reductions below the 2005 levels of existing sectors over the period 2008-2020.[63] Moreover, it has been argued that the volume of CDM/JI credits, if carried over from phase II (2008–2012 to phase III 2013-2020) in the EU ETS will undermine its environmental effectiveness, despite the requirement of supplementarity in the Kyoto Protocol.[64]

See alsoModifica

ReferencesModifica

  1. ^ Denny Ellerman, A. e Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 1, n. 1, January 2007, pp. 66–87, DOI:10.1093/reep/rem003.
  2. ^ http://www.minambiente.it/export/sites/default/archivio/allegati/emission_trading/2010-06-10_GuidaEsplicativa_raccolta_dati_9a2__2__rev.pdf
  3. ^ http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/35&format=HTML&aged=1&language=IT&guiLanguage=en
  4. ^ Errore nelle note: Errore nell'uso del marcatore <ref>: non è stato indicato alcun testo per il marcatore EC 2008
  5. ^ Europe Forcing Airlines to Buy Emissions Permits, The New York Times, October 24, 2008
  6. ^ Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 10 October 2007.
  7. ^ UK Emissions Trading Scheme DECC
  8. ^ ITL link, EU ETS review key for 2008 prices Carbon Finance 9 January 2008
  9. ^ a b c d Newbery, D., Written evidence., in Memorandum submitted by David Newbery, Research Director, Electric Policy Research Group University of Cambridge., The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change. The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee, 26 febbraio 2009. URL consultato il 30 aprile 2010.
  10. ^ Hepburn, C., Regulating by prices, quantities or both: an update and an overview (PDF), in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, n. 2, 2006, pp. 226–247, DOI:10.1093/oxrep/grj014. URL consultato il 30 agosto 2009.
  11. ^ Questions and Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans for 2008 to 2012 EU November 2006
  12. ^ Öko-Institut report: "The environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the EU ETS WWF November 2005
  13. ^ NAPs 2005-7: Do they deliver? Climate Action Network Europe 2006
  14. ^ a b Neuhoff, K., Memorandum submitted by Karsten Neuhoff, Assistant Director, Electric Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change. The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee, 22 febbraio 2009. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2010.
  15. ^ a b c Carbon Trust, Memorandum submitted by The Carbon Trust (ET19). In (section): Minutes of Evidence, Tuesday 21 April 2009. In (report): The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change. Produced by the UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee. The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, su publications.parliament.uk, UK Parliament website, March 2009. URL consultato il 30 aprile 2010.
  16. ^ Question and Answer on the revised EU ETS EUROPA, Brussels 2008
  17. ^ Barker, T. et al., 11.7.2 Carbon leakage., in B. Metz et al. (a cura di), Mitigation from a cross-sectoral perspective., Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Print version: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., and New York, N.Y., U.S.A.. This version: IPCC website, 2007. URL consultato il 5 aprile 2010.
  18. ^ a b c d Grubb, M. et al., Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System, su climatestrategies.org, Climate Strategies, 3 agosto 2009. URL consultato il 14 aprile 2010.
  19. ^ Nancy Stauffer, Carbon emissions trading in Europe: Lessons to be learned, su mit.edu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative, 29 maggio 2008. URL consultato il 25 ottobre 2010.
  20. ^ Q&A: Europe's carbon trading scheme, su news.bbc.co.uk, BBC News, 20 dicembre 2006.
  21. ^ Carbon 2006 market survey (PDF), su pointcarbon.com, Point Carbon, 28 febbraio 2006.
  22. ^ Analyse van de CO2-markt (in Dutch), su emissierechten.nl, Emissierechten, November 2007.
  23. ^ Emissions trading: 2007 verified emissions from EU ETS businesses, su IP/08/787, European Commission Press Release, 23 maggio 2006. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2009.
  24. ^ Emissierechten (in Dutch)
  25. ^ Emissions trading: EU-wide cap for 2008-2012 set at 2.08 billion allowances after assessment of national plans for Bulgaria, su europa.eu, 26 ottobre 2007. URL consultato il 24 gennaio 2011.
  26. ^ Linking in the EU ETS IISD
  27. ^ Questions & Answers on Aviation & Climate Change EU Europa
  28. ^ AFP, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein to join EU emissions trading system, su eubusiness.com, EUbusiness Ltd, 27 ottobre 2007. URL consultato il 28 ottobre 2010.
  29. ^ Including Aviation into the EU ETS: Impact on EU allowance prices ICF Consulting for DEFRA February 2006
  30. ^ Stavros Dimas Speech House of Commons London, EU Europa 21 November 2005
  31. ^ DEAD LINK Naturvardsverket (in Swedish)
  32. ^ Emissions trading: Commission decides on first set of national allocation plans for the 2008-2012 trading period EU Europa November 2006
  33. ^ a b c d e f CCC, Chapter 4: Carbon markets and carbon prices, in Building a low-carbon economy – The UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, The First Report of the Committee on Climate Change, Print version: The Stationary Office. This version: CCC website, December 2008. URL consultato il 26 aprile 2010.
  34. ^ Gilbertson, T. and Reyes, O. Carbon trading: how it works and why it fails. Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjold Foundation, 2009
  35. ^ Member States' compliance with the Emissions Trading Scheme EU Europa Environment Committee 27 November 2006
  36. ^ a b CCC, Meeting Carbon Budgets – the need for a step change (PDF), Progress report to Parliament Committee on Climate Change. Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 36(1) of the Climate Change Act 2008, The Stationery Office (TSO), 12 ottobre 2009, ISBN 9789999100076. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2010.
  37. ^ a b Jones, B. et al., Appendix 1.2 Climate Change: Economic Impact and Policy Responses. In (book): Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policy Issues. In: World Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook, Globalization and Inequality, su imf.org, IMF website, October 2007. URL consultato il 26 aprile 2010.
  38. ^ Analysis of NAPs for the EU ETS Ecofys August 2004
  39. ^ NAPsReport_Summary Climate Action Network 2006
  40. ^ Market analysis Emissierechten (in Dutch)
  41. ^ Market information EEX
  42. ^ NAP Assessment summary Ecofys (registration required)
  43. ^ Emissions trading: Commission decides on first set of national allocation plans for the 2008-2012 trading period EU Europa
  44. ^ Kirsten Macey, No Sinks in the EU ETS, Hotspot newsletter 41, Climate Action Network, March 2006, retrieved 2009-10-04.
  45. ^ a b Sean Carney, EU Carbon Market Suffers Further Setback, in The Wall Street Journal, 28 gennaio 2011.
  46. ^ a b c Bill Lehane, Hackers steal carbon credits, in The Prague Post, 26 gennaio 2011. URL consultato il 16 aprile 2011.
  47. ^ Greek police trace EU carbon rights thieves, in Reuters, 29 gennaio 2011.
  48. ^ UK Parliament, Examination of Witnesses, Mr Anne Theo Seinen (Questions 242-269). In (section): Oral and Written Evidence, Tuesday, 12 May 2009. In (report): The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change. Produced by the UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee. The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, su publications.parliament.uk, UK Parliament website, 12 maggio 2009. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2010.
  49. ^ World Wildlife Fund, Memorandum submitted by the World Wildlife Fund. In (section): Oral and Written Evidence, Tuesday 31 March 2009. In (report): The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change. Produced by the UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee. The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, su publications.parliament.uk, UK Parliament website, March 2009. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2010.
  50. ^ Jones, B. et al., Box 4.5. Recent Emission-Reduction Policy Initiatives. In: Chapter 4. Climate Change and the Global Economy (N. Tamirisa et al.). In: World Economic and Financial Surveys: World Economic Outlook: Housing and the Business Cycle, su imf.org, IMF website, April 2008. URL consultato il 21 aprile 2010.
  51. ^ EU Emissions Trading System: Failing at the third attempt, Corporate Europe Observatory/Carbon Trade Watch, April 2011
  52. ^ Carbon emissions trading in Europe: Lessons to be learned MIT Energy Initiative, 2008
  53. ^ a b Climate Change and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): Kyoto and Beyond U.S. Congressional Research Service (2008)
  54. ^ a b c d e f The European Union's Emissions Trading System in Perspective MIT/Pew Center 2008
  55. ^ Europe’s Problems Color U.S. Plans to Curb Carbon Gases, Steven Mufson, The Washington Post, April 9, 2007
  56. ^ Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the Eu Ets Based on the 2005 Emissions Data Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers (2007)
  57. ^ Annela Anger, Dr Terry Barker, Dr Athanasios Dagoumas, Dr Lynn Dicks, Dr Yongfu Huang, Dr Serban Scrieciu and Stephen Stretton., Memorandum submitted by the Cambridge Centre for Climate Change Mitigation Research (4CMR), in The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climate change., The fourth report of the 2009-10 session, UK Parliament House of Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee., 3 marzo 2009. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2010.
  58. ^ Emissions trading: lessons learnt from the 1st phase of the EU ETS and prospects for the 2nd phase Climate Policy (2006)
  59. ^ Leigh Phillips, EU emissions trading an 'open door' for crime, Europol says, su euobserver.com, EUobserver, 10 dicembre 2009. URL consultato il 28 ottobre 2010.
  60. ^ Cyber-scam artists disrupt emissions trading across EU EU Observer (2010)
  61. ^ EU approves revised ETS rules to combat cyber crime Euractive (2010)
  62. ^ Pohlmann, 'The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme' (p.362), in Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading, Ed. Freestone (2009)
  63. ^ EU ETS Amending Directive 2009 EUROPA, p.78 (2009)
  64. ^ The EU ETS, CDM and the Carbon Market Mission of Thailand to the EC (2009)

External linksModifica

Official pages

How ETS works

Key reports, and assessments